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1 Introduction
Does international trade improve the unemployment rate? With regard to NAFTA participa-
tion, there were a lot of statements on this question by the media and government ocers in
the United States. Some people believed that international trade induces job destruction.1)
Some advocators of this statement often emphasized the pro-competitive side of trade lib-
eralization. However, most of the literature of international trade ignores the relationship
between the unemployment rate and the trade-induced pro-competitive eect, which is one
of the important eects of international trade.2) If unemployment exists, then how does the
pro-competitive eect of international trade aect the unemployment rate and the welfare of
firm owners? This paper discusses these points.
In this paper, we incorporate the eciency wage of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) into
Neary’s (2009) general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model to investigate the relation-
ship between the unemployment rate and the trade-induced pro-competitive eect, which
comes from strategic interaction among oligopolistic firms. We find that trade improves the
unemployment rate. In addition, using numerical analysis, we reveal that, if firm productiv-
ity is suciently low, then international trade improves the utility of firm owners.
Our model shows that international trade promotes a decrease in the market power of
oligopolistic firms, and, hence, an increase in the real wage of employees. An increase in
the real wage of employees increases the dierence between the present-discounted util-
ity values of unemployment and employment: the non-shirking condition (NSC, hereafter)
relaxes. Therefore, the unemployment rate improves.
Next, international trade has the following two eects on the utility of firm owners: the
pro-competitive eect and the employment eect. The pro-competitive eect implies that
international trade decreases the monopoly power of firms and reduces profit, which reduces
1) For example, see Davidson and Matusz (2010).
2) In recent years, some economists have investigated the relationship between international trade and un-
employment. For example, Matusz (1996), Hoon (1994), Moore and Ranjan (2005), Egger and Kreickemeier
(2009), Davidson and Matusz (2010), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), and Davis and Harrigan (2011).
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the nominal wage of firm owners. On the other hand, the employment eect implies that
international trade improves the unemployment rate and promotes an increase in total output
and a decrease in price. Hence, if the employment eect is larger than the pro-competitive
eect, then international trade improves the utility of firm owners.
To focus on the pro-competitive side of international trade, Neary (2009) constructs
a GOLE model with the competitive labor market and shows that the trade-induced pro-
competitive eect promotes an increase in both aggregate and workers’ welfares and, on the
other hand, a decrease in the firm owner’s welfare. Hence, we believe that the GOLE model
is appropriate for considering the relationship between trade-induced pro-competitive eect
and welfare of firm owner who receives firm profit.
To embed unemployment into the GOLE model, we use the eciency wage model from
the seminal paper by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). This model explains that unemployment is
produced by the eciency wage, which prevents workers from shirking. Using this model,
we show the relationship between the trade-induced pro-competitive eect and unemploy-
ment.
Only a few attempts so far have been made at investigating the relationship between
eciency wage and intra-industry trade.3) Matusz (1996) combines the monopolistic com-
petition model of Krugman (1980) with the eciency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984). He shows that trade liberalization promotes a deep division of labor, which implies
an increase in the varieties of intermediate goods and, hence, reduces the price index. A
reduction of the price index promotes an increase in the real wage rate. Hence, NSC relaxes,
which improves the unemployment rate. Moreover, Davis and Harrigan (2011) incorporate
the eciency wage of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) into the monopolistic competition model
with firm heterogeneity of Melitz (2003). Using numerical simulation, they show that the
reduction of trade cost promotes an increase in the real wage of workers but has a small in-
3) One of our purposes is to reconsider intra-industry trade with the eciency wage model. Related papers
include Hoon (1994), Matusz (1996, 1998), Altenburg and Brenken (2008), and Davis and Harrigan (2011).
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fluence on unemployment. However, these studies do not consider the relationship between
the pro-competitive eect and the unemployment rate.
In addition, Egger and Etzel (2012) incorporate the unionized oligopoly model into
Neary’s GOLE model. They investigate the relationship between the trade-induced pro-
competitive eect and the unemployment rate, focusing on how trade liberalization aects
the wage dierential among workers and firm owners. Unemployment, in their model, is
produced by the reservation wage, which trade unions impose on oligopolistic firms.
There are a small number of empirical studies investigating the relationship between
trade liberalization and unemployment. Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) find that unemploy-
ment and trade openness are negatively correlated, which corresponds to our result.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 constructs a basic model
that merges the eciency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) into the GOLE model
of Neary (2009). Section 3 shows that trade liberalization promotes an increase in real wage
of employee, and hence it relaxes the NSC constraint generates unemployment. In addition,
we investigate the relationship between the trade-induced pro-competitive eect and the
utility of firm owners. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Preferences
We consider a representative consumer. In this economy, there is a continuum of sectors
z 2 [0; 1]. In addition, each sector has n  1 identical firms producing identical goods,
respectively. Total consumption in sector z is defined as x(z) and the price is p(z). The utility
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function of the representative consumer is specified in CRRA form as follows4):
U =
Z 1
0
x(z)1 
1    dz; (1)
where 0 <  < 1.5) The aggregate demand in each good is restricted by the following budget
constraint:
Z 1
0
p(z)x(z)dz = I: (3)
The inverse demand of good z in a country, derived from utility maximization, is:
p(z) = 1
x(z) ; (4)
where the Lagrange multiplier, , implies the marginal utility of income.6) From Equations
(3) and (4),  is derived as follows:
 =
266666664
R 1
0 p(z)
 1
 dz
I
377777775

: (5)
In addition, we obtain the indirect utility, ˜U, from Equations (1), (4), and (5) as follows:
˜U =
I1  
R 1
0 p(z)
 1
 dz

1    : (6)
4) This paper assumes a CRRA utility function, which has the properties of iso-elastic demand. McAfee and
Lewis (2009) and Beard (2013) study the properties of iso-elastic demand under oligopolistic competition.
5) All consumers are infinitely lived, risk-neutral, and discount the future at rate . Subject to an intertempo-
ral budget constraint, consumer i maximizes the following expected intertemporal utility function, Wi:
Wi = E
"Z 1
0
Ui exp(t)dt
#
; (2)
where we implicitly assume that consumers cannot borrow and lend. This assumption follows Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984).
6) The CRRA specification in Equation (1) is a special case of the Gorman (1961) form. Therefore, it allows
for consistent aggregation over agents with dierent incomes.
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2.2 Firm behavior
In this paper, assumptions of firm behavior are based on Neary (2009). We consider the
m  1 countries trade with each other and assume that each country is completely symmetric
in all respects and trade cost is zero. Hence, all variables of each country are also identical.
Because of the symmetric assumption, we are able to focus on the home country case.
Each firm in sector z supplies its good q(z) to each country, and, hence, total production
of each firm in sector z is m  q(z) and the only production factor is the worker. Firm produc-
tivity is defined as h > 0, which is identical among sectors. The firm’s production function
in sector z is defined as m  q(z) = h  l(z), where l(z) represents the firm’s factor input in
sector z. In each sector, there are n  1 identical firms, which are exogenously determined
and, hence, total output in sector z is x(z) = m  n  q(z). Each firm competes a` la Cournot in
its respective sector, and it takes the price of the other sectors as given. The workers receives
only wage, w.7) The firm profit in sector z is defined as
(z) = m[p(z)   w=h]q(z): (7)
From Equation (7), the profit maximization condition is derived as follows:
1
(mnq(z)) 

1   
mn

 h = w: (8)
The LHS of Equation (8) represents the marginal profit of each firm, and the RHS represents
the marginal cost. From Equations (4) and (8), we obtain
w
p(z) =

1   
mn

 h: (9)
Moreover, we integrate Equation (9) from sector 0 to 1 and obtain the real wage of the
7) In our paper, we assume that total firm profit is distributed to firm owners. We explain this assumption in
Section 3.2 in detail.
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worker:
w
 "Z 1
0
p(z)  1 dz
# 
 1
= h 

mn   
mn

: (10)
Next, we substitute the Equation (10) into (6) and obtain the indirect utility of worker l, ˜Ul:
˜Ul =
1
1    

h 

mn   
mn
1 
: (11)
2.3 Eciency wage and the labor markets
We consider a labor market based on the eciency-wage model constructed by Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984). In their model, unemployment exists because firm owner has limited
resources to monitor worker’s eorts. The work eort of the employee generates disutility,
e > 0; if the worker is unemployed or shirks, then e = 0. The firm owner imperfectly
monitors the eort of the worker. Therefore, the employee has incentive to shirk his work.
However, if his shirking is discovered, then the worker is fired.8)
The probability of detection is defined as g > 0. The break-up rate is exogenously
determined by b > 0, and the accession rate is a, which is endogenously determined. In
addition, we define Vs, Vn, and Vu as the present-discounted value of utility for shirking
employees, non-shirking employees, and the unemployed, respectively. From Equation (1),
(4), and (5), the indirect utility of each worker is derived ˜Ul   e =
w1 
"R 1
0 p(z)
 1
 dz
#
1    e.9)
By solving the simple dynamic programming problem, in the steady state, we obtain
Vu = a(Vn   Vu); (13)
8) The utility of agent j is
U j =
Z 1
0
x˜ j(z)1 
1    dz   e; (12)
where x˜ j represents agent j’s consumption of the good from sector z, and e is work eort of agent j.
9) From Equation (11), we know that the utility of employee, Ul, does not depend on the market size, L.
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Vn = ˜Ul   e + b(Vu   Vn); (14)
Vs = ˜Ul + (g + b)(Vu   Vs): (15)
where  > 0 is the constant discount rate.10) From Equations (14) and (15), if Vn  Vs, then
it is not valuable for the employee to shirk. Hence, the firm imposes the following condition
to prevent shirking:
Vn = Vs: (16)
Using Equations (14), (15), and (16), we derive
Vu = ˜Ul   e( + g + b)g (17)
There is a total endowment of L workers. From Equation (17), the flow-out of the num-
ber of unemployed getting a job is equal to that of the number of employees becoming
unemployed:
a
 
L  
Z 1
0
nl(z)dz
!
= b
Z 1
0
nl(z)dz: (18)
From Equations (13), (17), and (18), we obtain the NSC as follows:
w1 
R 1
0 p(z)
 1
 dz

1    = e
2666666666641 + b + g + b
R 1
0 nl(z)dz
g

L   R 10 nl(z)dz
377777777775 : (19)
10) In our model, we focus on the case of 0 <  < 1 because, if  > 1, then unemployment does not break out
since the utility of unemployment would be u(0) =  1. However, if 0 <  < 1, unemployment can break out
because the utility of unemployment is u(0) = 0.
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2.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the unemployment rate in equilibrium. Using Equations (9) and
(19), we obtain
1
1   

h 

1   
mn
1 
= e
2666666641 + b + g + b
R 1
0 nl(z)dz
g(L   R 10 nl(z)dz)
377777775 : (20)
From Equation (20), we derive the unemployment rate in equilibrium, u¯, as follows:
u¯ = 1  
R 1
0 nl(z)dz
L
= 1  
1
1 
h
h 

1   
mn
i1    e 1 + b+g 
be
g +
1
1 
h
h 

1   
mn
i1    e 1 + b+g  : (21)
From Equation (21), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If 11 
h
h 

1   
mn
i1 
> e

1 + g

, then 0 < u¯ < 1.
Proof. If 0 < u¯ < 1, then the RHS of Equation (21) is positive:
be
g
+
1
1   

h 

1   
mn
1 
  e
 
1 +
b + 
g
!
> 0; (22)
, 1
1   

h 

1   
mn
1 
> e
 
1 +

g
!
: (23)

We explain Proposition 12. The LHS of the condition of Proposition 1 represents the
utility from work, and the RHS represents the non-shirking worker’s disutility from work.
Note that Proposition 1 does not depend on the break-up rate, b.
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3 Trade-Induced Pro-Competitive Eect
3.1 International trade and unemployment rate
In this section, we consider the eect of trade liberalization. In this paper, we interpret trade
liberalization as an increase in the number of countries, m.
From Equation (10), we immediately obtain Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Trade liberalization increases the real wage of workers.
Proof. We define the real wage of the worker as w¯. From Equation (10),
w¯  w
 "Z 1
0
p(z)  1 dz
# 
 1
= h 

mn   
mn

: (24)
Next, if we dierentiate Equation (24) with respect to m, then
dw¯
dm =
h
(mn)2 > 0: (25)

In addition, from Equation (21), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Trade liberalization decreases the unemployment rate.
Proof. Equation (21) shows total employment,
R 1
0 nl(z)dz:
du¯
dm =  
h1 

1   
mn
   
m2n
be
g + Q
2  beg < 0 (26)
where Q = 11 
h
h 

1   
mn
i1    e 1 + b+g . 
We explain Propositions 13 and 14. Trade liberalization induces further competition
among firms, which reduces market power in each firm which implies a decrease in the
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price in each sector. Therefore, firm profit declines, and the real wage of workers increases.
Because of the increase in their real wage, the dierence between the expected utility of
employment and that of unemployment expands. That is, workers have a higher utility of
employment and a lower utility of unemployment than before: they will want to work, and
they will not want to get fired. Hence, the expansion implies that the NSC is relaxed. The
relaxation promotes an increase in employment in each sector, and, therefore, an increase in
the total output in each sector.
3.2 Firm owners
This section discusses the relationship between the trade-induced pro-competitive eect and
the utility of firm owners. Hereafter, the number of firm owners is defined as H > 0, and
the firm owner’s income is represented by wh. In addition, we assume that all firm profit is
absorbed by the firm owner:
R 1
0 n (z)dz = wh H. This assumption follows Egger and Etzel
(2012), Kreickemeier and Meland (2013), and Kamei (2014).
Using Equations (7), (21), and (24), we obtain the utility of firm owners, ˜Uh, as follows:
˜Uh =
1
1     w
1 
h
"Z 1
0
p(z)  1
#
=
1
1    
266666666664 mn 
L

1
1 
h
h 

1   
mn
i1    e 1 + b+g 
H

be
g +
1
1 
h
h 

1   
mn
i1    e 1 + b+g 
377777777775
1 
:
(27)
We dierentiate Equation (27) with respect to m and obtain the following condition:
d ˜Uh
dm Q 0; (28)
()
 
be
g
+ Q
!
 Q   h1  
mn

1   
mn
  be
g
Q 0; (29)
where, Q = 11 
h
h 

1   
mn
i1    e 1 + b+g .
Next, we use numerical analysis to confirm the above result, (29), and assume that
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 = 0:01, m = n = 3,  = 0:5, e = 1, b = 0:2, and g = 0:3.11) Figure 1 shows the re-
sults of the calculation. The horizontal axis represents firm productivity, h, and the vertical
axis represents the change in the firm owner’s utility due to trade liberalization, d ˜Uh=dm.
In Figure 1, if firm productivity, h, is suciently low, then trade liberalization improves the
utility of firm owners: d ˜Uh=dm is positive. On the other hand, if firm productivity is su-
ciently high, trade liberalization causes the utility of the firm owner to decline: d ˜Uh=dm is
negative.
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.3  0.5
 0.7  0.9
h
Figure 1: Trade liberalization and firm owner’s utility.
We explain the intuition of the above results. From Equation (21), we know that high
productivity of a firm implies a low unemployment rate. Hence, if firm productivity is su-
ciently high, then trade liberalization reduces the utility of firm owner.12) In this case, there
is low unemployment in the economy. Hence, trade liberalization very few produce addi-
tional output due to new employees. Therefore, this eect, which we call the employment
eect, is weak. Thereby, the pro-competitive eect from trade liberalization dominates the
employment eects.
Next, we investigate the case where firm productivity is suciently low. In this sce-
11) In the parameters case, the condition of 0 < u¯ < 1 is h > 0:282647.
12) In our model, if the labor market is competitive or firm productivity, h, is very high,
R 1
0 nl(z)dz = L, then
the results correspond to that of Neary (2009). He considers the case of the perfect labor market of a general
equilibrium with oligopoly. In his model, trade liberalization reduces firm profit and there is no unemployment.
Hence, trade liberalization does not produce additional output, and, hence, it reduces the utility of firm owners.
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nario, trade liberalization improves the welfare of firm owners because there are a lot of
unemployment in the economy, which implies that the employment eect is larger than the
pro-competitive eect.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we combine a GOLE model with the eciency wage model of Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984). We summarize our results as follows. Trade liberalization reduces market
power of oligopolistic firms and raises the real wage of workers, which relaxes the NSC.
Therefore, trade liberalization improves the unemployment rate. In addition, if firm produc-
tivity is suciently low, trade liberalization raises the utility of firm owners.
Some extensions are left for future research. To begin with, we can assume asymmetric
countries. In our model, all countries are symmetric, which implies North-North trade.
However, if we adapt asymmetric assumption to our model, the impact of trade liberalization
may have dierent eects among the countries with regard to unemployment. Next, our
model has assumed that the number of firms are exogenous. In addition to this, it is also
valuable to consider the case of free entry-exit of firms. Then, trade liberalization reduces
the number of firms, which implies monopoly power of surviving firms increases. Therefore,
if trade liberalization suciently decreases the number of firms, then unemployment rate
may increase.
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